RFID is a design problem. Hmm. Has the encryption been demonstrated to be weak, then?
If you say "what encryption?" then my new passport is going to go ping. 
There's no problem with the encryption. Here's the important bit:-
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But could you - and what use would my passport be to you? A security feature of the chip ensures that information cannot be added or altered, so you couldn't put your picture on my chip. So is our attack really so impressive?
The Home Office thinks not. It correctly points out that the information sucked out of the chip is only the same as that which appears on the page, readable with the human eye. And to obtain the key in the first place, you would need to have access to the passport to read (with the naked eye) its number, expiry date and the date of birth of its holder.
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That's why the readers at Immigration controls have both a scanner to read the data from the page, and this data is used to initiate the conversation between the reader and the RFID to confirm this is what is on the passport.
No reader can talk to your RFID and get data from it without knowing your passport number, expiry date, and date of birth.
The problem is that it doesn't prevent copying. If you hand your passport over at a hotel or rental car company then they could scan the page, copy the RFID data, and then clone your passport. But that still means they'll have to forge the rest of the passport, which is trickier than cloning an RFID.
